

SSS 7

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TO : Members of the Subcommittee

FROM: Ralph Block, Chairman, SANACC Subcommittee on
Special Studies and Evaluations

1. A survey of the accomplishments of the Subcommittee to date measured by immediate initial requirements of a National Security Information Agency at the outbreak of war indicates that the Subcommittee is as yet in no position to present planning conclusions adequate to required practical implementation in the initial stages of war. SWNCC 304/6 and SANACC 304/12 provide substantially only the basic principles of organization.
2. The present program of the Subcommittee, to analyze and assess the contributory potentials of government departments, with the primary emphasis upon the Military Establishment, Department of State and CIA, will assist in arriving at these planning conclusions. However, it may be pointed out that this survey at this time is like a Quartermaster's inspection of a warehouse without a requisition order. Until the Subcommittee has completed the organizational charting of SANACC 304/12, personnel and equipment standards will not become available to provide a basis for either requisitions or budgets.

If war should come, these questions will be first asked by a Director of NSIA:

- a. What is needed in the way of people and things?
- b. Where can they be obtained?
- c. How much money will be required from Congress?

Until the Subcommittee has formulated an answer to a, enumerations and descriptions of the facilities of government agencies which may be applicable to NSIA lack the salient relationship essential to such a study.

3. To obtain special types of manpower at the outbreak of war, and mould them into an informed, effective agency for psychological warfare, will require a thoroughly worked out theory of psychological warfare firmly based in American political and social concepts. Such theory exists at the present time only piecemeal in various works on the subject and in the operational records of OWI and OSS. The Subcommittee is agreed it can be assumed, on the necessity of fundamental research on

- 2 -

of which comprehensive theory can be evolved. Nevertheless, may be questioned whether the slow processes to be expected from such research in the Research and Development Board will contribute anything of practical value in a period of less than six months at the best.

4. The Chairman suggests, therefore, for consideration by the Subcommittee the following:

A. That the Subcommittee complete the organizational chart in all operational levels; to serve as a basis for estimating personnel and technical facilities requirements:

(1) Existing and obtainable within the government; (2) to be created or otherwise obtained.

a. Operations in the United States.

1. Washington, New York, San Francisco offices.
2. Domestic Regional offices.

b. Operations overseas.

1. London, Paris (initial installations for short wave operations to Soviet controlled countries as distinguished from information and cultural activities of American Missions and theater operations under military direction).

Involved in these considerations will be special civilian personnel for technical purposes such as languages, political, psychological, and area experts, and engineers. Similar T.O.'s will be required for military estimates.

B. Budget.

Hearings before the Bureau of the Budget and Congressional Committees will require hard figures.

5. It is suggested for the Subcommittee's consideration that special papers be developed for the purpose of recommending to SANSAC the appointment of ad hoc Committees to prepare studies and recommendations on:

a. Theory and principles of psychological warfare applicable to a United States agency.

- 3 -

b. The relationship of NSIA to censorship in territorial United States.

c. Relationship of NSIA to civilian defense in territorial United States.

d. The study and evaluation of types of leaflet bombs, mortars and air dropping devices for use in theaters of operation, and recommendations as a basis for requisitioning.

cc: Col. W. L. McNamara
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